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This article’s purpose is to assess the arguments of democratic peace
scholars as they apply to the states of the former Soviet Union. The claim
that liberalism is associated with nonviolent means of conflict resolution,
in particular, is questionable in the case of newly independent states, in
which liberalism bears a closer resemblance to nineteenth-century Euro-
pean liberal nationalism than it does to the universalist liberalism envisioned
by theories of the democratic peace. I argue that this nonuniversalist form
of liberalism is in fact widespread among the Soviet successor states and
that, as a result, liberalism’s implications for peace are not nearly as benign
as had previously been believed. In other regards, however, the attitudes
of elites, the mass public, and liberals are in fact fairly consistent with those
posited by democratic peace theory, though relative elite bellicosity de-
clines as the policy-making arena broadens. A democratic peace in the
region is therefore viable but particularly vulnerable to national issues, as
well as to the effects of concentration of political power in the hands of a
narrow group of elites.
The goal of this article is to assess whether the underlying assumptions about the
attitudes of elites and masses in the democratic peace literature are applicable to
the Soviet successor states. I argue that the literature on the democratic peace has
failed to appreciate one very significant fact: liberalism as a belief system is not
monolithic, and the form it takes and the context in which it arises determine
whether the spread of liberal ideas will cause peace among liberal states or create
opportunities for more conflict. At least as far as beliefs about the legitimacy of the
use of force are concerned, the type of liberalism which has arisen in the Soviet
successor states is more likely to do the latter than the former.
Given the importance which the United States has placed on relations with Russia
and the former Soviet republics and the potential for conflict which they represent,1
the answer to this question is critical. Any region of the world in which the number
of irredentist claims approaches, and by some counts surpasses, the number of
sovereign states represents a grave danger to itself and to others. Russett, the most
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1 The literature pertaining to this point is vast. Some of the more frequently cited examples are Mearsheimer (1990),
Snyder (1990, 1994), and Van Evera (1990–91).
prominent of democratic peace scholars, writes (1993:135–8) that the road to peace
lies in democratization and that the West should therefore work to promote it. Layne
(1994), on the other hand, suggests that the evidence for the democratic peace is
not strong enough to warrant the conclusion that the possibility of inculcating
democracy in Eastern Europe is worth the risk of subsequent regional entanglement.
The question of whether or not liberalism, shared democracy, and/or institutional
constraints suffice to ensure (or at least strongly promote) peace among these states
is a critical one for the West as it faces difficult decisions regarding which regional
policies to pursue.
The current consensus seems to be that they will. Democratic peace theories have
proliferated in recent international relations literature:2 starting with Dean Babst’s
1964 article, elaborations have appeared in a handful of books, dozens of articles,
and hundreds of seminar and conference papers. This attention has produced a
wealth of findings. Large-N studies have demonstrated, convincingly and repeat-
edly, that democracies are not significantly less warlike in general than are other
types of regimes,3 but that they are significantly less warlike when dealing with
one another: there have been no wars between democracies,4 and even warlike
behavior—use of military force, display of force, or threat of force—is conspicu-
ous in its absence (Small and Singer, 1976; Doyle, 1983a, 1983b; Chan, 1984;
Rummel, 1985; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Russett, 1993; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz,
and Russett, 1996).5 These statements seem to apply to sub-state groups and, to
a lesser extent, to the democratic states of antiquity as well (Ember, Ember, and
Russett, 1992; Russett, 1993).
These findings have been critically examined, at the very least, by those who
question the definitions of democracy which are used (Chan, 1984, 1993; Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Ray, 1993, 1995; Oren, 1995), those who question the
definition or operationalization of war (Chan, 1984, 1993; Morgan and Campbell,
1991; Weede, 1992; Dixon, 1994), and those who suggest that elements which are
not central to the idea of democracy itself might be responsible for the pacificity of
democratic dyads (Gaubatz, 1991; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Lake, 1992;
Bremer, 1993). More recently, the democratic peace has been called into question
by subjecting it to tests against realism (Layne, 1994) and by suggesting that it is a
plausible result of random chance (Spiro, 1994; Farber and Gowa, 1995; see also
Russett, 1995; Spiro, 1995). Despite, or perhaps because of, this intense scrutiny,
the results still stand.6
2 From the onset, I should note that the phrase “democratic peace theory” is hardly without its problems. There are
in fact quite a few theories to explain this phenomenon, and many imply that liberalism is as important as democracy;
I use this phrase for the sake of convenience.
3 For a notable exception to this generalization see Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth (1996), which suggests that
selection effects in the process which leads from peace to war mask a significant monadic relationship between democracy
and the use of force (both initiation and highest level used).
4 Some borderline cases make it difficult to say with absolute certainty that democracies have never gone to war with
one another. Ray (1993, 1995) constitutes an outstanding examination of most of these cases.
5 One interesting but relatively unexplored result found in Maoz and Abdolali (1989:23) is that autocratic states are
less likely to initiate conflict with one another than are states in other types of dyads. Morgan and Campbell (1991)
suggest that this relationship is due to the fact that autocracies and democracies face more leadership constraint than
do “anocracies,” or relatively incoherent states. Another interesting possibility was raised by Kissinger (1966), who
suggested that similar administrative structures and similar formative experiences among leadership groups will
promote greater understanding and will remove many of the sources of diplomatic friction that lead to war. Hermann
and Kegley (1995) elaborate a similar position, discussing the democratic peace from the point of view of social identity
theory. The latter two positions suggest that like states—not just democratic states—should be more pacifistic when
dealing with one another.
6 On this point, as should be apparent, informed opinion disagrees, often vehemently. My own position as of this
writing is that the large-N critiques offered so far have yet to muster results sufficient to warrant the rejection of previous
findings. See Russett (1995) for a defense of this position.
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Most explanations of the democratic peace phenomenon focus either on the
constraint engendered by the domestic political structures of democratic states or on
the impact of the liberal norms associated with democracies as sources of peace
(Morgan, 1993:200).7 Structuralists believe that the nature of the democratic
political system itself is responsible for the democratic peace. Leaders are con-
strained from going to war by the domestic political system, not by ideology. Because
leaders of democratic states can only remain in power by following the mandate of
the vox populi—or at least by not disregarding it—those leaders will not hazard the
costs of going to war without the consent of the people (Morgan and Campbell,
1991; Kiser, Drass, and Brustein, 1995). Moreover, leaders of democratic states are
aware of one another’s constraints and, therefore, have no reason to fear attack from
other democracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). Security, bred of mutual
domestic disincentives, leads to peace.8
Proponents of the normative school, on the other hand, maintain that the
normative foundations of liberalism, when applied to policymaking in the interna-
tional realm, are conducive to peace. The fact that democracies do not fight one
another is explained by the fact that democracy is strongly associated with liberal-
ism,9 which in turn gives rise to mutual respect and beliefs in both autonomy and
freedom from foreign intervention. These beliefs result in peace among states that
share them (Doyle, 1983b).10
I argue that, in the states of the former Soviet Union, the logic which underpins
normative theories of the democratic peace is unlikely to hold. The parallel
institutional and ethnic cleavages of the old regime created an incentive, once
glasnost was under way, to voice secessionist claims in both political and national
terms. At the same time, the struggle for national self-determination which resulted
in the Union’s dissolution created tension between two of liberalism’s fundamental
tenets: peaceful resolution of conflicts and autonomy. The result has been the rise
of a nonuniversalist form of liberalism—specifically, liberal nationalism11—which
explicitly values the latter over the former. The existence of a nonuniversalist
liberalism makes it possible to speak of the freedom of the individual, not from the
state, but from a different group of individuals. Conflict therefore manifests itself,
not between the individual and the state, but between groups—a development that
may be more, not less, likely to lead to international conflict, especially if the
geographical boundaries of the group (in this case, the nation) differ from those of
7 The distinction between the independent variables, liberalism and structural constraint, is of cardinal importance.
Neither is synonymous with democracy, though both are associated with it. Nondemocracies can be subject to constraint
(Morgan and Campbell, 1991), and democracies vary in the degree to which their citizens collectively espouse liberal
norms (Lilla, 1994). Therefore, oddly enough, it may be inaccurate and misleading to attempt to divine the sources of
the democratic peace by measuring democracy. The primary implication of this observation is that the scholarly debate
is miscast: the positive heuristic of the democratic peace research program—that is, in Lakatos’s words, the “methodo-
logical rules” which tell us “what paths to pursue” (Lakatos, 1970:132)—is poorly aimed, has been for some time, and
will continue to be as long as theories fail to take into account the distinctions between democracy, liberalism, and
constraint.
8 The most parsimonious variants of these explanations are monadic—that is, liberalism breeds pacifism and
republicanism breeds constraint, regardless of the nature of a state’s potential opponent. Such explanations are
hard-pressed, however, to explain the fact that democracies are no less warlike vis-à-vis undemocratic states than are
any other types of states. Recently Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) have constructed a signaling game which
demonstrates that dyadic restraint is a plausible product of monadic structural constraint, and Ray (1995:30–1) has
pointed out that their argument works equally well for monadic normative constraint.
9 More specifically, democracy both promotes liberalism and relies on it as a source of legitimation; though it may
be difficult to say that one “causes” the other, they have a tendency to coexist symbiotically.
10 This review is necessarily cursory; for a more elaborate index to recent studies see Hermann and Kegley (1995:513).
11 My treatment of this phenomenon is largely historical rather than philosophical. Readers interested in more
detailed discussions of the theoretical (in)compatibilities of liberalism and nationalism should see Tamir (1993), as well
as the many thoughtful and thought-provoking reviews it has prompted, especially Levinson (1995).
BEAR F. BRAUMOELLER 377
the state. Liberal nationalism is centered on the idea of national self-determination;
its adherents—“deadly doves”—are both very liberal and very willing to use force
to achieve their goals.12
The struggle for independence in Ukraine, as in most non-Russian republics,
during the slow disintegration of the Soviet Union followed this pattern: the desire
for national independence was one that appealed to both liberalism and national-
ism, and the result was a fusion of the two ideologies. In Russia, on the other hand,
liberalism and nationalism have never coexisted peacefully. From the time of Peter
the Great, liberalism has been viewed by Russian nationalists as an imported
European idea, one that is unsuitable for Russia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union
did not bring about the same commonality of purpose between liberalism and
nationalism in Russia that it did in other former republics, simply because Russia’s
independence was never at issue. The main question as the Soviet state disintegrated
was not whether Russia would be independent but rather whether or not the political
entities around it would remain part of its territory.
It is therefore reasonable to expect that democratic peace theories’ predictions
regarding the attitudes of liberals in the Soviet successor states will be incorrect in
one critical area: the reluctance of liberals to use force. It is also reasonable to expect
this effect to be strongest in those republics that fought earliest and hardest for
independence.
First, I will briefly discuss existing theories of the democratic peace and derive
hypotheses about the attitudes that should be found in elites and the citizenry if
those theories are to be believed. Next, I will elaborate upon the above discussion
of the relationship of liberalism to nationalism in Russia and Ukraine and of the
effects of the Soviet system on that relationship. Based on this discussion I will then
derive hypotheses regarding the attitudes of liberals versus illiberals, and elites
versus the mass public, in both countries. Following this section, I will test all of the
hypotheses, using data from surveys carried out in Russia and Ukraine between
1993 and 1995. Finally, in order to gauge the generalizability of the results
regarding liberalism and nationalism, I will examine data from a 1990 survey of
nine Soviet republics and assess their implications regarding the relationship of the
two to one another.
Theories and Hypotheses of the Democratic Peace
In the following discussion I will focus on two necessary events in the process that
leads to war initiation in democracies: first, a perception of conflict must exist, and
second, force must be decided on as the appropriate means of resolving that conflict.
The reason for focusing on these events is simple: they are the two points at which,
by most accounts, structural and normative factors are supposed to prevent war.13
12 I should note that the implications of this argument for the Soviet successor states have some important points of
contact with those put forth by Mansfield and Snyder (1995). The authors point out that democratizing states are more,
not less, likely to go to war with other states. They attribute this fact to a combination of elite coalition politics, which
gives elites the incentive to mobilize the citizenry with nationalistic rhetoric, and imperfect institutions (pp. 7, 22), which
permit the manipulation and misinformation necessary for such a strategy to succeed. I argue, on the other hand, that
liberalism in newly independent states is of a sort that is not particularly pacifistic, and may even be belligerent, due to
the circumstances surrounding its conception. When applied to the Soviet successor states, Mansfield and Snyder’s
argument suggests that the democratic peace may not hold because one of its preconditions—stable, functioning
institutions—is absent. My critique, in a way, is more damning: if the argument is correct, the newly independent states
may be more war-prone because the preconditions stipulated by democratic peace theorists are present.
13 Hence my use of the word “necessary”; in the democratic-peace account, the detour on the road to war occurs at
one of these two points, so if all instances of peace between democracies are to be attributed to the variables highlighted
by democratic peace scholars, it must be the case that all potential wars between democracies must pass through these
two stages.
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Therefore, if either shared liberalism or shared structural constraint is responsible
for the democratic peace, it should be the case that they result in either a lowered
perception of conflict between states or a compulsion to favor nonviolent solutions
to conflicts once they arise.14
Structural Theories
Structural theories generally posit that the domestic political structure of democratic
states is configured such that leaders can be rendered unable to involve their
countries in war due to the prohibitively high political costs of doing so.15 Democ-
racies can avoid war with one another because they are aware of one another’s
constraints: decision makers in each democratic country know that they need not
fear attack from the others.16
Arguments to this effect are based on some form of mechanism for constraint
which operates in democracies. They differ in that they describe diverse ways in
which such mechanisms are set in motion. For Kant, constraint is based on the
assumption that costs will be higher for the citizenry than for the elite (Kant, 1957).
For Montesquieu, Schumpeter, and others, the likely economic costs of war, which
citizens are unwilling to bear, bias leaders’ decision calculus toward peace (Montes-
quieu, 1900; Schumpeter, 1955). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992:153–4,
297–8) proceed from somewhat different assumptions—namely, that domestic
political costs are a function of a state’s probability of success in war and its valuation
of the status quo.
In any case, the common foundation of structural arguments is the proposition
that democracies do not fight because leaders are constrained from doing so by
domestic political costs, regardless of the origins of those costs.17
HYPOTHESES
Constraint is very difficult to measure. Using a survey, it might be possible to gauge
the extent to which leaders believe themselves (or one another) to be constrained,
but the degree to which leaders perceive constraint is likely to be influenced by
recollections of a few salient events. As recent events tend to be more salient, and
the surveys took more than a month to execute, it is likely that earlier responses
would differ from later responses because they would be based on different events.
The results would very likely be biased in unpredictable ways and therefore be
unusable.
It is possible, however, to test other logical implications of structural theories. All
of them imply that, in one way or another, leaders are more prone to use force than
are the people. Indeed, if leaders are held in check by political costs generated by
the public, this must be the case.18 If it were not—that is, if the public and their
14 As both perception of hostile relations and the decision to use force are necessary for a democratic state to initiate
a war, showing that liberal norms or structural constraint impedes either of these processes would be adequate to provide
support for democratic peace theories.
15 As Morgan and Campbell (1991) point out, such constraint is not unique to democratic states—any domestic
political regime that limits the power of the executive, or in which the executive faces a competitive selection process,
is to some degree constrained. Despite the fact that all constrained states are not democratic, however, all democratic
states are constrained.
16 For elaboration of this point see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992:ch. 5) and Russett (1993:40).
17 It could be argued that Lake (1992) is an exception to this generalization. He suggests that democracies are less
able to collect rents than are their autocratic counterparts and as a result will be less expansionist. Their constraint
therefore arises, not from costs, but from lack of benefits.
18 Note that I do not assume, or claim, that such institutional constraint functions in these states. Both the impetus
to constrain and the mechanisms for constraint are necessary for constraint to occur; even if I can demonstrate that the
impetus to constrain exists, institutional factors will determine whether or not it will be realized.
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leaders were possessed of equally bellicose proclivities—why would any costs ever
be imposed on leaders for the use of force?
Again, this study will focus on two critical junctures on the path from peace to
war: the perception of conflict between two states, and the decision to use force to
resolve that conflict. Therefore, if the structural argument can be supported, at least
one of the following hypotheses should be confirmed:
H1: Leaders perceive foreign relations to be more conflictual than do citizens.
H2: Leaders are more likely than citizens to advocate the use of force to resolve
conflicts.
Normative Theories
The general normative argument is that some of the characteristics of states that
create in them the desire to go to war are absent in relations among democracies.
This lack of impetus stems from the nature of the shared liberal ideology which
legitimates such states—specifically, from the moral and political underpinnings of
that ideology.19 This pacifism does not extend to undemocratic states, whose lack
of legitimacy and propensity to act in a manner antagonistic to liberalism introduce
the possibility of conflict. Therefore, according to this view, liberalism and the belief
that a potential opponent is democratic are both necessary, but only jointly suffi-
cient, to ensure peace among democracies.
The proposed linkages between liberalism and peace are numerous and complex.
First, de Tocqueville suggests that liberalism’s emphasis on individual freedoms
tends to undermine nonegalitarian social divisions and hierarchies, resulting in
greater perceptions of equality among peoples.20 From these perceptions will arise
a fundamental empathy, and empathy brings with it lack of conflict: “. . . the
mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are
produced by the equality of conditions . . . —all these causes concur to quench the
military spirit” (Tocqueville, 1873:324).
Second, due to this notion of fundamental equality, liberal political culture places
an emphasis on the behavioral norms of exchange and cooperation rather than
coercion. The division of power within a party system, for example, implies that
outcomes must be negotiated rather than mandated (Rummel, 1985:420–1). Thus,
a liberal political order inculcates norms of reciprocity in its citizenry. As Leng
(1993) has shown, in fact, liberal democracies are more likely than other states to
utilize reciprocal, or tit-for-tat, bargaining strategies in order to induce cooperation.
As a result, liberal states de-legitimate violence as a means of achieving political
objectives (Chan, 1984, 1993; Rummel, 1985). As Nincic succinctly puts it, “The
values on which liberal democracy is founded and the practice of negotiating
differences that is the hallmark of its political culture do not lead to easy belief in
the virtues of military coercion” (Nincic, 1992:9). Competition is legitimate and
19 Since the publication of Doyle’s (1983a, 1983b) work, which specifically pointed to liberal norms as the cause of
the peace between liberal states, the tendency has been for scholars to switch to an emphasis on democratic, rather than
liberal, norms (see, e.g., Russett, 1993:30–8). I have chosen to examine liberal, rather than democratic, norms because
doing so seems to me to be more true to the original formulations of the normative school. In any event, as I will argue
in the section on operationalizations, belief in representative government is one element of liberal norms.
20 It is interesting to note, as does Sartori (1987:359, 383–6), that the individualistic essence of liberalism and the
egalitarian nature of democracy can pull in different directions—all the more reason to keep in mind the distinction
between liberalism and democracy, as what follows from the former need not follow from the latter. For example,
European liberals in the first half of the nineteenth century stood for equality in its legal sense alone, and therefore
opposed such democratic notions as universal manhood suffrage. For a spirited argument that liberty and democracy
are in fact incompatible see Guizot (1852:72–3, 347–9).
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necessary, but bounded (Dixon, 1994:15–6)—the institutions of government are
utilized for the nonviolent resolution of competing claims.
Liberal pacifism is by no means absolute, however. The tolerance which lies at
the heart of liberal ideals cannot be universal; nowhere in the classical liberal
tradition does one find a defense of arsonists or murderers, for example. Liberalism
generally advocates a conditional freedom—that is, the freedom (of an individual
or a state) to act in virtually any manner, as long as no harm is done to others
(Mendus, 1989:118–9). In short, “Every society fears and excludes some ‘wrong’
freedoms” (Spitz, 1982:15). Accordingly, the peace engendered by empathy and
reciprocity extends only to those states that abide by liberal principles: in so doing,
they avoid behavior that liberal states consider “just cause” for war.
HYPOTHESES
The best way to test the propositions of the liberal-norms school is to examine the
attitudinal dispositions of liberals versus illiberals within a society.21 By virtue of
their emphasis on empathy and reciprocity, adherents to a liberal ideology should
perceive less conflict with other states if they believe those other states to be
democratic. Because of their predilection for nonviolent means of conflict resolu-
tion, they should also be less likely to advocate the use of force in general.22 If these
statements are true, the following hypotheses should be confirmed:
H3: Individuals who are themselves liberals, and who believe another country to
be democratic, will perceive less conflict with that country than would otherwise be
the case.
H4a: Liberals are less likely than illiberals to advocate the use of force to resolve
conflicts.
Liberal Nationalism
Most modern portrayals of nationalism suggest that liberalism and nationalism are
flatly contradictory in that the former implies, and the latter precludes, universal
recognition of individual rights and autonomy. This viewpoint has led to an
“either-or”-ism in the minds of many prominent thinkers,23 as well as considerable
disillusionment with nationalism among scholars of liberalism (Judt, 1994) and of
international relations (Snyder, 1993).
Nevertheless, Fukuyama (1992), who argues that liberalism and nationalism are
contradictory, concedes that an accommodation between the two is possible if
nationalism becomes tolerant. (The example of tolerant nationalism he chooses,
incidentally, is post-Soviet Ukraine.) Moreover, critics of liberal theory (Schmitt,
21 My use of the somewhat awkward word “illiberal” rather than “conservative” is due to the fact that conservatism
consists of more than the absence of liberalism. Illiberals are not automatically adherents to, say, Burkean conservatism,
with its emphasis on religion and circumstantial morality.
22 Complete dyadic explanations specify that peace will arise only if both sides exhibit an aversion to violence;
otherwise the more doveish side may be tempted to preempt, knowing its violent opponent’s nature. It is still the case,
however, that liberal states—and by extension liberals—should exhibit an aversion to violence in general in the first
place; otherwise, their democratic partners could find no reassurance in their norms. It is this general perception, that
the use of force in resolving conflicts is illegitimate, that I attempt to gauge here.
23 For example, Smith (1991:144) writes that “the anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe in 1989 were at
first treated as western-style movements of political and economic liberalism, until it was realized how powerful were
the nationalist dimensions of popular mobilization”; and Kaiser (1994:397) notes, “The recent events in Georgia also
provide strong evidence that nationalism rather than democracy was the mobilizing force behind the demise of the
USSR.”
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1985:11; Hochschild, 1986:398) have suggested that liberalism is nowhere truly
universal, and that the nation provides a common delimiter for its scope.24 Tamir
(1993:121) notes that, “Since liberalism cannot provide a theory of demarcation, it
has adopted for this purpose the national ideal of self-determination.” Even John
Stuart Mill wrote that “[f]ree institutions are next to impossible in a country made
up of different nationalities” due to the heterogeneity of the populace and the
conflict that would inevitably ensue (Mill, 1958:232).
An examination of the history of nationalism (see especially Hayes, 1931;
Kohn, 1944; Shafer, 1972; Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1992;
Nodia, 1992) suggests that, more than simply exhibiting some degree of com-
patibility, liberalism and nationalism have often been intimately linked to one
another. Liberal nationalism, though it had already established firm roots in
England prior to the Revolution, made its continental début as a reaction to the
retrograde tendencies of traditional nationalism as well as to the frank denial of
individualism embodied by Jacobin nationalism.25 Its primary emphasis was
autonomy,  the  right  of  individuals  to  self-government—a  goal  upon  which
liberalism and nationalism were in ready agreement.
The two ideas found a common home in the revolutionary movements of the first
two thirds of the nineteenth century largely because the boundaries of nations were
only very rarely the same as the boundaries of states. This brings up a critical point:
because its goal—indeed, its raison d’être—was national self-determination, and
because the majority of nations were subject to alien rule or rules, liberal nationalism
had either to accept an extremely undesirable status quo or to abandon liberalism’s
principled objection to the use of force.
Here, then, was the tragedy of liberal nationalism, not unlike that
of the earlier Jacobin nationalism. Its logic and its fine intentions
were not sufficient of themselves to insure its triumph. It needs
must grasp the sword and slay its adversaries.
The sword, therefore, it repeatedly grasped, and its adversaries
it slaughtered in vast numbers. Revolt followed revolt, and war
followed war. Under liberal auspices occurred the terrible rebel-
lions of “enslaved” Greeks and Yugoslavs against the Ottoman
Empire and of “oppressed” Latin Americans against Spain; the
riots of 1820 in Italy and Spain; the widespread insurrections of
1830 in France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy; the even more
widespread and deadly insurrections of 1848 in France, Germany,
Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and Ireland; the Polish uprisings of
1831 and 1863; the Crimean War of 1854–1856; the wars of Italian
unification in 1848–1849, 1859–1860, 1866, and 1870; the wars of
German unification in 1848–1849, 1864, 1866, and 1870–1871;
and the mighty struggle of 1861–1865 in the United States for the
preservation of a national union and the emancipation of an
enslaved race. (Hayes, 1931:161–2)
This acceptance of violence is the source of Best’s (1988:11) comment: “The
[French] Revolution’s goodwill towards humankind blew from the barrels of its guns
24 Schmitt (1985:9) makes this point well: “Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals
equal but unequals will not be treated equally. . . . In the democracy of English sects during the seventeenth century
equality was based on a consensus of religious convictions. Since the nineteenth century it has existed above all in membership
in a particular nation, in national homogeneity.” (Emphasis added.)
25 The typology follows that of Hayes (1931); though others are equally valid, this one focuses most usefully on the
period surrounding the emergence of liberal nationalism.
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as well as from the mouths of its orators.” The new ideology brought with it new
kinds of conflict, wars for sovereignty among states and sub-state groups whose
conception of legitimacy and of the nation itself differed (Waltz, 1959:107–9;
Howard, 1978; Hoffmann, 1995:164).26
European liberal nationalism, by most accounts, was gradually subsumed by
integral nationalism, the variety best known to (and least loved by) twentieth-century
scholars.27 The prevalence of integral nationalism in the twentieth century often
creates the mistaken impression that all nationalism is integral, that liberal nation-
alism died in August of 1914 in Sarajevo (if not in January of 1871 at Versailles).
Abundant evidence indicates that this is not the case. Hayes (1931:165) notes that,
although liberal nationalism is  for the most part  a  phenomenon found in
oppressed or subject nationalities, “liberal nationalism is still an active force” even
in post-independence nations. It is nevertheless true that liberal nationalism has
found its home for the most part in nations that are not yet states or that have
recently achieved statehood: locations as dissimilar as post-colonial Africa (Neuber-
ger, 1986:17, 78), modern Quebec (Stark, 1995), and the successor states to the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Context
Ironically, the entity most responsible for the appearance of liberal nationalism in
the Soviet successor states following the collapse of the Soviet Union may have been
the Soviet state itself. Faced with the problem of governing people of over 100
nationalities, the Soviet state responded by organizing itself as a federal state and
dividing its political subunits along national lines. Fifteen nations were given full
republics of their own, while smaller nationalities were often given an autonomous
republic, region (oblast), or area (okrug).
When the question of independence arose, these national-political divisions
became fault lines: the largest national groups had ready-made state structures and
authority arrangements which greatly facilitated the organization and execution of
independence movements (Breuilly, 1993:346–7). At the same time, the conflicts
that grew out of the state’s dissolution spurred the growth of nationalist senti-
ment. To the extent that political and ethnic boundaries were aligned in the
non-Russian republics, liberalism and nationalism found common cause in the
struggle for independence from Russia.28 Liberals were among those most ready
to die—and, if necessary, kill—for their nation’s independence. In Russia, on
the other hand, the goal of the use of force would have been to quash rather than
to ensure autonomy—a goal liberals found distasteful at best but which nation-
alists actively promoted.
Liberalism in Ukraine
One of the best examples of the role of Soviet federalism in the facilitation of liberal
nationalism, in fact, is Ukraine. Prior to World War II, Ukrainians were divided
26 It is worth noting that the use of force was generally principled—as Willis (1928:133) wrote of British liberal
opinion during World War I, “Stern fighting would be necessary, but if the sword were in one hand, the Bible, or at least
J. S. Mill, should be in the other.”
27 There is considerable merit to the idea that the latter derived much of its form from the realization of the former.
Liberal nationalism’s emphasis on the unity of the nation and acceptance of the use of force, crucial in struggles for national
independence, often manifested themselves in chauvinism, militarism, intolerance, and in the extreme expansionism once
independence had been achieved (Hayes, 1931:166, 225–8). Germany found that, although liberalism can be conducive to
nationalism, nationalism need not be conducive to liberalism; the failure of German liberalism following the unification of
the country is particularly illustrative of this process (Sheehan, 1978; Schwan, 1987).
28 For a cogent analysis of the relationship between conflict and identity see Hopf (1996).
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among Soviet Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary; following the Soviet victory Stalin
annexed the latter territories to Ukraine, bringing all Ukrainians together within
the same state. For this reason, Subtelny (1994a:188) concludes that “it is extremely
doubtful whether Ukrainian nationalist forces could have ever been as effective in
maintaining and expanding Ukraine’s borders as was the Soviet regime.”
That these national movements incorporated substantial elements of liberalism
is difficult to deny.29 The Draft Program of the People’s Movement of Ukraine for
Perestroika (Rukh) of February 1989 contains a strong emphasis on individual
freedoms, both positive and negative, and a condemnation of ethnic exclusivism. It
also advocates the inclusion of national minorities in Ukrainian political life. Less
than a year and a half after this Program was made public, the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet issued a declaration of sovereignty, using language very similar to Rukh’s (see
Furtado and Chandler, 1992). In subsequent years Rukh has taken considerable
pains to distance itself from more virulent ethno-nationalists (Subtelny, 1994a:190).
Nor is Ukraine the only example of liberal nationalism in the post-Soviet sphere:
The national movements in the three Baltic states, the Ukraine and
Moldavia were not monolithic, but  the  largest  group  in each
republic constituted itself as a “popular front.” Two things strike
one immediately about these fronts. They are democratic both in
their aspirations and in their operations, and they are not ethnically
exclusivist. In each republic members of ethnic minorities are
welcomed by, and participate in, the fronts. These characteristics
set off the Soviet European fronts from some of the national
movements and nationalist parties that have emerged in Eastern
Europe, as well as perhaps from parallel movements in the Cau-
casus and Central Asia, and certainly from some of the more radical
Russian nationalist groups. (Gitelman, 1992:17)
In Ukraine, as in the non-Russian republics in general, the dissolution of the
Soviet Union combined with preexisting national/institutional cleavages to provide
strong incentives for independence. This objective appeals to both liberalism and
nationalism; therefore, accommodation between the two was not difficult, and the
pro-independence “national fronts” accommodated elements of both. As the next
section demonstrates, this was not the case in Russia.
Liberalism in Russia
Liberalism and nationalism have been staunch adversaries in Russia since the
Westernization that occurred under Peter I and Catherine II. Probably the earliest
visible sign that liberalism was taking root as a viable alternative ideology to
autocracy was the uprising of the Decembrists in 1825 (Riasanovsky, 1984:319–20).
By 1830 the schism between Slavophiles and Westernizers which was to inspire much
of nineteenth-century Russian art, literature, and politics had become apparent.
Slavophilism, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of Russian history and glorifica-
29 This is not to say, of course, that all nationalism in Ukraine and the other Soviet successor states is liberal. In the
case of Ukraine, the independence struggle in the years following the first World War began as a liberal nationalist
endeavor but before long was overtaken by a particularly virulent form of integral nationalism, one that persisted in
underground organizations in Ukraine for well over a decade (Subtelny, 1994b:441–4, 553–4). Nevertheless, as
Armstrong (1990:14–5) notes, “There remained . . . strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian,
principles, even when the participants in the movement verbally rejected them. Formal learning, respect for established
authority, individual decision, and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the
most radical groups.”
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tion of life on the mir, was quintessentially nationalistic, but it flourished specifically
as a reaction against the encroachment of Western ideas (Kaiser, 1994:38). By the
early 1900s, liberalism had become fairly widespread, so much so that the Consti-
tutional Democrats (Kadets), formed in 1905, comprised large percentages of the
first two Dumas. The liberalism of the Kadets, however, had little in common with
that of mid nineteenth-century liberal nationalists like Mazzini: individual rights
were seen as an end in themselves, rather than as a necessary component of national
self-determination. In short, the Kadets already had their own country; they just
wanted to improve it by establishing a constitutional regime (Salvadori, 1972;
Riasanovsky, 1984).
Despite the ideological orthodoxy of the Soviet years, recent Russian politics have
in many interesting ways mirrored the Slavophile-Westernizer split (Khasbulatov,
1993:57, 123; McFaul and Markov, 1993:13–4; Kaiser, 1994:39). Liberalism and
nationalism have found themselves at cross-purposes: liberals’ willingness to coun-
tenance self-determination flies in the face of nationalists’ desire not to replace a
political system which, despite its flaws, was largely of Russian design with a system
based on those of Russia’s Cold War adversaries (Hough and Fainsod, 1979:568–9).
Moreover, there has not been any strong impetus for liberalism and nationalism
to join forces in order to “free” Russia. Russia, in that it was the heart of the old
Soviet Union, was already its own country, the Union its empire. To nationalists,
the liberation of Russia from Soviet rule meant the disintegration of that empire
and the deterioration of Russia’s international position, goals they found less than
appealing (Breuilly, 1993:350). Accordingly, efforts to form “popular fronts” in the
RSFSR, unlike those in other republics, fell through abruptly and often due to the
inability of liberals and nationalists to agree on a program. By one account (Dunlop,
1983:76) there were at least six such attempts, all of which failed.
HYPOTHESES
If the liberalism which I have measured in Ukraine is in fact of the nationalist sort,
there are some relatively straightforward predictions which should be borne out by
the evidence. First of all, we should find that Ukrainian liberals, due to the
circumstances surrounding the rise of liberalism in Ukraine, are more willing to use
force than illiberals, though this is not necessarily true of liberals in Russia.
Secondly, we should find that liberals in Ukraine are more likely to associate
themselves with nationalism than are illiberals, but that this relationship does not
hold in Russia. This is the crucial test: much of the nationalism in the Soviet successor
states is integral rather than liberal and is therefore of a form that pure liberals
would certainly find unappealing, so conventional wisdom would suggest that the
relationship between the two is likely to be negative, not positive.
Finally, we would expect liberals in Ukraine to evince a particular view of
citizenship, stressing tolerance toward the views of ethnic minorities and permissive
citizenship laws. How meaningful the results of this test are depends critically on
the results of the second test. That liberals are tolerant and inclusivist would come
as no surprise in and of itself, but the argument for liberal nationalism in Ukraine
will be strengthened considerably if they are demonstrably nationalistic as well.
Therefore, if the liberalism measured in the Ukrainian survey is in fact of a
nationalist variety, we should expect the following hypotheses to be borne out:
H4b: Liberals in Ukraine are more likely than illiberals to advocate the use of
force to resolve conflicts, especially those involving Ukraine and Ukrainians.
H5: Liberals should identify themselves with nationalists in Ukraine but not in
Russia.
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H6: Liberals in Ukraine should express inclusivist concepts of citizenship.
Research Design
The Surveys
Three surveys, designed at the Center for Political Studies (CPS) at the University
of Michigan, are the primary sources of data for this study. The first is a mass/elite
survey carried out in Russia in February and March 1993, the second is a nearly
identical survey carried out in Ukraine in April 1994, and the third is a follow-up
mass/elite survey carried out in Russia in October and November of 1995.30 The
first survey contains a small number of questions relevant to this project and in many
ways was intended to gauge its feasibility. The results were so striking that further
questions were included in the second and third surveys, with the goal of providing
a more comprehensive test of a wider range of theories.
The composition of the surveys is as follows. The 1993 Russian mass survey is
made up of 1,243 respondents, randomly selected from European Russia.31 The
1994 Ukrainian survey, in which no elites were interviewed, was conducted through-
out Ukraine. The 1995 Russian mass survey is made up of 820 respondents, also
drawn from European Russia.32 The 200 Russian elites surveyed in 1993 and the
180 surveyed in 1995 were selected because their positions occasioned considerable
contact with foreign policy issues. They are divided among five occupations: the
media, academics, economic elites (businesspeople and government officials),
the military high command, and political elites (legislators and executives).33
Because of this study’s focus on the difference between the people most directly
responsible for decisions regarding war and peace—in short, leaders—and the mass
public, only the latter two categories are used (unless otherwise noted).34
A fourth survey, carried out by Gibson and Duch (1990), is also used to assess
hypotheses regarding liberalism and nationalism. This survey provides a particu-
larly valuable glimpse of the values and beliefs of the citizens of the republics on the
eve of the Union’s dissolution. The survey covers nine republics; one, Estonia, had to
be dropped because the number of valid responses was too small to permit analysis.
Operationalization of Key Variables
The hypotheses sketched above require that a total of seven variables be measured
before they can be evaluated. Those seven are: leader/citizen status; liberalness;
perceptions of hostility of other states; perceptions of the degree of democracy that
characterizes other states; advocacy of the use of force; nationalist attitudes; and
opinions about citizenship.
30 All three surveys were carried out under the auspices of Professor William Zimmerman. Without his inclusion of
relevant questions on the surveys, this study would not have been possible.
31 More precisely, “The 1,243 people interviewed were identified by a five stage sampling design with sampling units
selected with a probability proportional to unit size in the first three stages. After that narrowing process, households
and apartments served as sampling units drawn from address lists (interviewers prepare lists of households in small
villages lacking a household register) and then persons were randomly selected from the identified households. The
care with which the sample frame was constructed and the persons interviewed were selected, given the design, was far
greater than in surveys undertaken in the ex-Soviet Union as recently as 1988–89” (Zimmerman and Stam, 1994:6–7).
32 The sample design differs from that of the 1993 survey in that very remote oblasts were eliminated from
consideration. Although this alteration should result in certain changes in univariate distributions, there is little reason
to believe that multivariate relationships will be systematically and significantly biased at this level of generalization.
33 The 1993 survey contains interviews with 40 individuals from each category. The 1995 survey contains interviews
with 30 individuals from each category, as well as 30 individuals in an additional category of economic elites.
34 The implications of including all categories of elites are examined below.
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The first is fairly straightforward—the military and political elites who were
interviewed in Russia are coded as leaders,35 other elites were dropped from the
analysis in order not to bias the remaining population, and everyone else was coded
as a citizen.36 The remaining operationalizations are somewhat more complex.
(Exact question wordings can be found in the Appendix.)
In the post-Soviet political environment, the word “liberal” has taken on a
bewildering variety of meanings. Simply asking whether or not someone considered
him- or herself to be a liberal would not produce meaningful results. Therefore,
respondents were asked questions designed to gauge how well they would fit the
classical Western definition of a liberal, based on their beliefs along three dimen-
sions: positive freedoms, negative freedoms, and the role of competition in govern-
ment (Doyle, 1983b). These three dimensions were then incorporated into a simple
additive index37 of liberal attitudes.38
In order to measure perceptions of democracy and hostility on the part of other
countries, respondents were given a list of countries, asked whether the other
country was more or less democratic than, or as democratic as, their own,39 and
then asked to rank them on a five-point hostility scale (“very friendly” to “very
hostile”). The other countries listed in the survey were China, the United States,
Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Georgia; in addition, Ukrainians were asked about
Russia and Russians were asked about Ukraine. The inclusion of a variety of
countries in the questionnaire served to decrease the chances that the results were
idiosyncratic and therefore to mitigate the “small-N” problem inherent in this
approach. As liberalism and perceptions of democracy were hypothesized to be
individually necessary but only jointly sufficient to bring about lessened percep-
tions of conflict, they were multiplied together to form an interaction term in
that equation.
In the Ukrainian survey, advocacy of the use of force was assessed across a wide
range of scenarios, including: defense of the country’s territorial integrity;40 eco-
nomic imperatives; defending the interests of countrymen abroad (both in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere); achieving national security; resolving other
crises elsewhere; and getting the country out of its current crisis. Unfortunately,
these questions were not asked in the 1993 Russian survey. In the 1995 Russian
survey,  however, five of the  seven  scenarios from  the Ukrainian survey were
repeated, while “achieving national security” and “resolving other crises elsewhere”
were replaced with “defending the interests of the Russian state” and “defending
the security of our friends abroad.”
35 80 people in the 1993 survey, and 60 in the 1995 survey.
36 No Ukrainian respondents were coded as elites.
37 The variables were also incorporated into a factor analysis, but the resulting factor correlated so highly with the
additive index (e.g., 0.994 in the 1993 survey of Russia) that the latter was preferred for reasons of simplicity.
38 For the pioneering work utilizing this index of liberalism see Zimmerman (1994).
39 Ukrainian respondents were also asked what democracy meant to them. As a check on the validity of the perceived
democracy questions, I examined the marginal probabilities of responses to these questions. On some dimensions, the
respondents evinced little understanding of democracy (the distribution of responses on the question of whether
democracy involved state ownership of industry, for example, was practically uniform), but on the items Westerners
most strongly associate with democracy (free elections, political parties, free speech, freedom of association) there was
overwhelming consensus: between 92 percent and 95 percent of respondents answered that these elements “exactly”
or “very nearly” described what they thought of as democracy.
40 Note that, especially in the context of Eastern European countries whose constituent elements agitate for
independence—as in the case of Ukraine—defense of territorial integrity is not the same thing as defense of one’s
national borders. The latter is suggestive of defense of the country from outside attack, while the former, which was
used in this study, suggests defense of the country from dissolution into its constituent political elements.
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In order to gauge nationalist sentiment, Ukrainians were asked how much they
themselves felt that they had in common with Ukrainian nationalists.41 Regarding
citizenship, Ukrainians were asked whether citizenship should be restricted to those
who had lived in Ukraine for ten years;42 whether people who cannot speak
Ukrainian (that is, Russians) have the right to be citizens; whether “more than
anything else” Ukraine is the homeland of ethnic Ukrainians; whether Ukraine
should be a place in which the ideas of everyone, including minorities, are welcome;
and whether anyone who lives in Ukraine is a Ukrainian. The latter two are
indicators of the kind of inclusivist view of the nation which liberals should express,
and the first is an indicator of the kind of exclusivist view which liberals should not
express.
The remaining questions—whether non-native speakers should be allowed to
be citizens, and whether Ukraine should be the homeland of ethnic Ukraini-
ans—are in fact ideal examples of the kinds of attitudes that characterize integral
nationalists. Accordingly, I add them, along with a third variable which gauges
the extent to which respondents believe the unity of Ukraine to be more
important than the needs of individual regions, to form a measure of integral
nationalism. This measure will be useful, both as a control variable and substan-
tively, in the analyses that follow.
Unfortunately, comparable data from the Russian surveys are not available, as
the same questions were not asked. One question in particular, however, can be used
to assess the hypotheses regarding liberals and nationalism: respondents were asked
whether Russia should follow the path of other industrialized countries or seek its
own, uniquely Russian path.43 Unfortunately, this question is not directly compa-
rable to the one asked in the Ukrainian survey, which introduces considerable
uncertainty into the analysis. I mitigate this problem by examining similar questions
which are comparable (in fact, identical) across republics in the section on “Gener-
alizeability,” below.
It was also necessary to insert some variables as controls in the analysis because
of their potentially confounding effects. Sociodemographic characteristics—in
particular, sex, age, and level of education—are often significant predictors of
liberal attitudes. Given that this is the case, if these characteristics are also
significantly associated with the dependent variables in these analyses (as they
often are), omitting them would misattribute their influence to liberalism. They
are not included in the hypotheses largely because, although their effects may
be considerable, they are not plausible explanations for the democratic peace.
Their inclusion is intended solely to ensure that liberalism’s effects are not
artificially inflated.44
41 This is a particularly difficult test in that the Ukrainian word for “nationalism” contains more radical and militant
connotations than does its English counterpart (Kasianov, 1996).
42 Ukrainian law—dating from October 8, 1991—stipulated that citizenship was restricted to those who had been
permanent residents of Ukraine for five or more years; therefore, the respondents would have been advocating a more
restrictive citizenship policy than the one that existed at the time. See Barrington (1995:ch. 3).
43 I owe a considerable debt of gratitude to Ben Goldsmith for his thinking regarding this survey item.
44 Sex is coded as 1 = male, 2 = female. Age is included as the last two digits of respondent’s year of birth (no
respondents were born before 1900; the oldest was born in 1902). Education is coded on a 1–8 scale, where 1 signifies
no formal education and 8 signifies postgraduate education. On the whole, the control variables showed few patterns
of interest, and their inclusion in the tables more than doubled the amount of space taken up while distracting from
the main substantive findings. For these reasons the coefficients are not reported, but the reader should rest assured
that they were included in the analyses.
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Empirical Results
Democratic Structure
The analysis was carried out using an ordered probit model, which was appropriate
given the ordinal nature of the dependent variables.45 The results are striking.
First of all, there is quite a bit of evidence to support structural theorists’ assertion
that the people are less warlike than are their leaders. Model I in Table 1 from the
1995 and 1993 surveys suggest that Russian decision makers have a somewhat more
pessimistic view of Russia’s relations with other countries than do her citizens. The
findings are significant but not robust:46 coefficients for four of the seven countries
are statistically significant in the 1993 survey, and coefficients for only two of the
seven are significant in the 1995 survey.
There is a plausible argument to be made that the composition of the elite sample
biases the empirical results—in particular, that including the military but excluding
economic and academic elites (many of whom have some input into foreign policy
decisions) makes the elite appear more intransigent than they really are. To test this
possibility I re-estimated the model and included all elites surveyed. The results are
reproduced as Model II, Table 1, for both the 1993 and 1995 Russia surveys. The
coefficients for liberalism and perception of democracy showed no change in sign
and only trivial changes in magnitude. As for the coefficients for elite status, most
point and range estimates from the 1993 survey changed only minimally. In the
1995 survey, some more noticeable changes took place. The larger set of elites was
notably more friendly toward Georgia, the United States, Germany, and China than
were political and military leaders; on the whole relations with the latter two were
even seen in a more positive light by elites than by the citizenry. The coefficients for
Estonia and Poland, on the other hand, were considerably more negative for elites
than for leaders.
Finally, it is possible that Russian leaders are more or less liberal than the mass
public,47 and that as a result the coefficients for leadership status reflect something
substantively different from that which interests us: we might be more interested in
the relative bellicosity of leaders than in the effect of leadership status when
liberalism has been controlled for. Accordingly, I estimated a third model (Model
III, Table 1) in which the liberalism/perceptions of democracy variables were
intentionally omitted.48 In both surveys the results largely remained stable; the 1995
survey saw no change in the pattern of significance, though leaders in the 1993
survey did perceive relations with six out of seven countries to be significantly more
hostile than did citizens once the liberalism variable was dropped (as opposed to
four of seven when the variable was included).
More support, though less robust, comes from Model I of Table 2. In the 1995
survey, Russian leaders did display significantly greater willingness than the public
to use force to defend the territorial integrity of Russia and to defend the interests
45 For technical details see McKelvey and Zavoina (1976); for a more comprehensive overview see Aldrich and Nelson
(1984).
46 By “robustness” I mean to denote relationships that hold consistently across countries (in Table 1) or scenarios
(in Table 2).
47 They are, in fact, significantly more liberal, but only barely so.
48 Of course, omission of relevant independent variables which are correlated with other independent variables
introduces bias into the coefficients of included variables, but in this case the argument suggests that the simple bivariate
relationship, absent controls, is of greater interest. Simply put, the constraint argument hinges on the leaders being
more bellicose than the citizenry; if we were to introduce some set of independent variables to control for the factors
that make leaders more bellicose and thereby reduce the coefficient to zero, it would only mask the most relevant
finding—that leaders are more bellicose than the citizenry.
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TABLE 1. Perceptions of Friendly Relations
RUSSIAN
SURVEY, China Ukraine U.S. Estonia Poland Germany Georgia
1995
MODEL I
Lib•Dem 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.041*** 0.012* 0.022*** 0.065***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Leader 0.151 –0.131 –0.363** –0.039 –0.299** –0.026 –0.066
(n = 60) (0.169) (0.165) (0.163) (0.170) (0.171) (0.168) (0.168)
MODEL II
Lib•Dem 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.039*** 0.013** 0.026*** 0.062***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Elite 0.226* –0.127 –0.285*** –0.225** –0.426*** 0.225* 0.169
(n = 180) (0.119) (0.113) (0.113) (0.119) (0.118) (0.117) (0.116)
MODEL III
Leader 0.075 –0.174 –0.376*** –0.012 –0.341** –0.042 –0.020
(n = 60) (0.162) (0.159) (0.156) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.158)
UKRAINIAN
SURVEY, China Russia U.S. Estonia Poland Germany Georgia
1994
Lib•Dem 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.017 0.040*** 0.025*** 0.021** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
RUSSIAN
SURVEY, China Ukraine U.S. Estonia Poland Germany Georgia
1993
MODEL I
Lib•Dem 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.055*** 0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Leader –0.460*** –0.349*** –0.308** 0.000 –0.253* 0.045 –0.145
(n = 80) (0.146) (0.144) (0.153) (0.143) (0.159) (0.171) (0.137)
MODEL II
Lib•Dem 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.066***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Elite –0.308*** –0.155* –0.239** –0.141* –0.246** 0.126 –0.124
(n = 200) (0.107) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) (0.107) (0.109) (0.104)
MODEL III
Leader –0.517*** –0.348*** –0.312*** –0.183* –0.362*** 0.153 –0.186*
(n = 80) (0.137) (0.130) (0.134) (0.132) (0.134) (0.138) (0.132)
Numbers are probit coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Tests of significance are one-tailed unless sign of coefficient is in unexpected direction.
*significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level
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of Russians in the former Soviet Union. On other issues responses were mixed; three
out of the remaining five coefficients are in the expected direction, though none is
statistically significant, and two are not.
In Model II of Table 2 I again contrast these findings to the results of a model in
which all elites are included, and again the results are weakened—in five of seven
cases the coefficient drops, indicating lessened belief in the legitimacy of the use of
force. In two cases elites, taken as a whole, are actually significantly less supportive
of the use of force than are citizens.
Finally, I again intentionally omit liberalism from the equation, and the magni-
tude of the coefficients drops across the board—evidence that strongly suggests that
Russian leaders’ liberalism tempers their views toward the use of force. In one case,
defense of the interests of Russians in the former USSR, the coefficient changes
from negative and significant to positive and significant once we cease to control
for liberalism.
TABLE 2. Advocacy of Use of Force
Defend Defend Defend Defend Defend Defend Get Russia
Variable: territor’l economic interests interests interests security of out of
integrity interests of Russians of Russians of Russian our friends current
in xUSSR elsewhere state abroad crisis
RUSSIAN
SURVEY,
1995
MODEL I
Liberal –0.018 –0.010 –0.036* –0.022 –0.033 –0.033 –0.083***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031)
Leader 0.707*** –0.064 0.425** 0.157 0.250 0.230 –0.378
(n = 60) (0.296) (0.191) (0.195) (0.218) (0.240) (0.228) (0.238)
MODEL II
Liberal –0.034 –0.009 0.031 –0.004 –0.034 –0.049* –0.098***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Elite 0.486*** –0.064 –0.239* 0.035 0.219 0.212* –0.529***
(n = 180) (0.176) (0.132) (0.135) (0.154) (0.162) (0.161) (0.169)
MODEL III
Leader 0.566** –0.049 –0.346** 0.144 0.169 0.188 –0.424*
(n = 60) (0.254) (0.170) (0.172) (0.195) (0.212) (0.202) (0.218)
UKRAINIAN Defend Defend Defend Defend Achieve Resolve Get Ukraine
SURVEY, territor’l economic interests interests national conflicts out of
1994 integrity interests of of security elsewhere current
Ukrainians Ukrainians crisis
in xUSSR elsewhere
Liberal 0.027 –0.008 0.085** 0.082** 0.036 0.120*** 0.045
(0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
Numbers are probit coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Tests of significance are one-tailed unless sign of coefficient is in unexpected direction.
*significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level
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What can we conclude from these results? First of all, there is considerable
evidence to support the structuralists’ point of view, though this evidence is not
robust. Secondly, the evidence is strongest in the area of perceptions of hostile
relations rather than beliefs about the legitimacy of the use of force. Finally, the
extent to which the structural explanation is likely to hold water depends largely on
the composition of the elite group which is responsible for the formulation of foreign
policy. Evidence for the structural argument is strongest among political and
military elites, and is especially strong when these groups are compared directly to
the citizenry, without controls. In cases in which other elite groups hold some sway
over foreign policy decisions, the relationship between decision maker status and
both perceptions of hostility and beliefs about the legitimacy of the use of force is
generally likely to be weaker and may even be reversed.
Liberal Norms
The results relating liberalism and perceptions of democracy to perceptions of
peaceful relations conformed very strongly to the predictions of normative theories.
In Russia, people who possessed liberal beliefs and who believed a foreign country
to be democratic were significantly more likely to answer that relations with that
country were friendly than they would otherwise have been. This relationship was
strongly significant across all seven cases in both 1993 and 1995. In Ukraine, the
same relationship held, though the results reached statistical significance in only six
of the seven cases. (See Table 1.)
Furthermore, there is weaker support for the link between liberalism and avoid-
ance of the use of force in the 1995 survey of Russia. In two cases—defense of the
interests of Russians in the former Soviet Union and getting Russia out of its current
crisis—liberals in Russia were less willing to use force than were illiberals. In all other
cases the signs of the coefficients were as expected. (See Table 2.)
Finally, Table 2 demonstrates that liberals in Ukraine are often, though not
always, more predisposed toward the use of force than are illiberals.49 Liberal
Ukrainians are more likely to advocate the use of force in defense of Ukrainians in
the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Ukrainian liberals are also more willing to
use force to resolve conflicts elsewhere—given the international activities of Ukraine
at the time of the survey, this item probably measures more than anything else
support for Ukrainian involvement in U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, al-
though there is certainly considerable ambiguity in the question.50 On the whole,
49 The fact that, as mentioned above, liberalism’s implications for resolving conflicts are not entirely determinate is
the reason for my use of two-tailed, rather than one-tailed, tests for significance in Table 2, though all significant cases
are significant at the 0.05 level or greater regardless of which is used.
50 The survey was carried out between April 11 and April 25, 1994. On April 13, 1994 it was announced that Ukrainian
peacekeepers—who had been present in Bosnia since 1992—would be sent to defend Gorazde, which was under Serb
attack. (The deployment was subsequently deferred, but not until three days after the last respondent had been
interviewed.) It therefore seems likely that the bulk of the respondents had recently been exposed to news of Ukrainian
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. To determine whether or not the new deployment had had an effect on liberal attitudes
toward the use of force to resolve conflicts elsewhere, I partitioned the sample into two groups—those who had been
interviewed before the announcement (n = 382) and those who had been interviewed afterward (n = 821)—and
determined that, although there was a slight increase in the slope coefficient for liberalism after the announcement was
made, it was very probably (p = 0.79) the product of random variation rather than of any systematic change in attitudes.
There was virtually no difference in overall evaluations of the legitimacy of the use of force to resolve external conflicts
between the pre-announcement and the post-announcement group. Given the prominence of the conflict in Bosnia
and of Ukrainian involvement in it (mortar fire had hit Ukrainian peacekeepers’ barracks in August of 1992, a Ukrainian
had been killed in Sarajevo in April of 1993, and a Ukrainian colonel had been named U.N. commander in Sarajevo
in early November of 1993), it seems likely that Ukrainian news stations were already running considerable coverage
of the crisis, and that as a result the deployment had little effect on Ukrainian public opinion.
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these findings are far more consistent with the liberal nationalism argument which
I have put forth than they are with the prevailing image of peaceful liberal norms
of conflict resolution.51
Liberal Nationalism
As Table 3 shows, there are indeed significant associations between liberalism and
inclusivist attitudes toward citizenship.52 These associations suggest, first of all, that
liberals are more likely to define Ukrainian citizenship in an inclusivist fashion. The
Ukrainian state they envision is one that is open to all, regardless of the amount of
time spent in Ukraine, and one that incorporates the opinions of minorities rather
than attempting to force them to assimilate.
The results from the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3 represent significant
support for the proposition that liberals are more likely to identify themselves as
nationalists. Again, this is perhaps the most crucial test for the proposition that the
liberalism encountered herein is of a national, rather than a universal, sort. In the
sixth column I include a measure of integral nationalism, defined above, to deter-
mine whether or not the relationship between liberalism and nationalism holds once
this variable is included. Two points are immediately apparent. The first is that
integralism—which, like liberalism, is measured on a 10-point scale—is also very
strongly associated with self-identification as a nationalist. The second is that the
coefficient for liberalism is virtually unchanged when the measure of integralism is
introduced, though the standard error has increased somewhat. Taken together,
these facts suggest that two very distinct forms of nationalism, liberal and integral,
are present in Ukraine.
As Russia’s uniqueness is a centerpiece of Russia’s (or any other country’s)
nationalist creed, and as I have posited that Russian liberalism—unlike that of the
TABLE 3. Liberal Views of Citizenship and Nationalism
UKRAINE 1994 RUSSIA 1995
Must live in All ideas All living Self-ID: Self-ID: Russia
Ukr. 10 incl. those of in Ukraine Ukrainian Ukrainian should
years to be minorities are nat’list nat’list follow
citizen welcome Ukrainians own path
Liberal –0.037** 0.076*** 0.043** 0.052** 0.049** –0.059**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
Integral — — — — 0.264*** n/a
(0.023)
Numbers are probit coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Tests of significance are one-tailed.
**significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level
51 One of the keys to interpreting these results is understanding which concepts are evoked when respondents
construct hypothetical opponents. In particular, liberals may unconsciously construct nondemocratic opponents. The
only observation I can offer in support of the assumption that this is not the case is that respondents are just as likely
(if not more likely) to construct an answer in terms of likely opponents, and many of these (Germany, Poland, Russia)
are widely believed to be relatively democratic.
52 The same control variables were included as in the previous analyses, for the same reason—to ensure that the
effects of liberalism were not overestimated—as well as to ensure comparability.
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other republics—is of a more internationalist (and particularly, Western) sort, we
should find that Russian liberals are less likely than illiberals to express nationalist
sentiments, as measured by agreement with the item regarding whether or not
Russia should follow its own path. As the last column of Table 3 demonstrates, this
is exactly the case.
Substantive Impact
Statistical significance, of course, is not the same thing as substantive significance.
A few examples should suffice to illustrate the extent to which the coefficients are
substantively significant. Holding all other variables at their mean values, Russian
leaders in the 1995 survey were less likely by 15 percent (32 percent vs. 47 percent)
than citizens to respond that the United States was either “friendly” or “very
friendly.” They were more likely by 13 percent (95 percent vs. 82 percent) to respond
that the use of force was legitimate in order to defend the country’s territorial
integrity. They were also less likely by 9 percent (12 percent vs. 21 percent) than
citizens to respond that the use of force would be legitimate to get Russia out of its
current crisis.
As to liberalism, perceptions of democracy, and perceptions of good relations, as
expected the effect of the two independent variables was strongest when both were
present. Among the citizenry, illiberals who thought the U.S. to be relatively
undemocratic had an estimated probability of 37 percent of responding that the
U.S. was either “friendly” or “very friendly.” Illiberals who thought the U.S. to be
democratic had an estimated probability of only 38 percent of giving one of those
two answers. Liberals who thought the U.S. to be relatively undemocratic had an
estimated probability of 43 percent of giving one of those two answers. Liberals who
thought the U.S. to be relatively democratic, however, were much more likely—57
percent—to perceive relations with the U.S. to be friendly or very friendly than were
any of the previous categories.
In order to gauge the magnitude of the positive effects of liberalism on advocacy
of the use of force in Ukraine, I have calculated and graphed marginal probabilities
of advocating the use of force at each point on the 10-point liberalism scale, keeping
all other variables at their mean values (Figure 1). The results show clearly that the
effects of liberalism are significant substantively as well as statistically. Moving from
extreme illiberalism to extreme liberalism roughly tripled the respondent’s prob-
ability of answering that the use of force in defense of the interests of Ukrainians in
the former republics and elsewhere is legitimate and quintupled the respondent’s
probability of answering that the use of force to resolve conflicts elsewhere is
legitimate.53
The relationships between liberalism and nationalism are represented graphi-
cally in Figure 2. Again, the results are substantively as well as statistically significant.
Moving from extreme illiberalism to extreme liberalism almost exactly doubles the
probability that a Ukrainian will respond that he or she has “some” or “a great deal”
(the two most positive of the four responses) in common with Ukrainian nationalists,
from 12 percent to 24 percent. In Russia, on the other hand, moving from extreme
illiberalism to extreme liberalism decreases the probability that a respondent will
53 One plausible interpretation of the data would be that extreme illiberals are relatively isolationist. I believe there
to be considerable validity to this interpretation. It in no way refutes the finding, however; illiberal isolationism itself
calls into question the relative pacificity of liberals.
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answer that “Russia should seek its own course” by about a fifth, from 78 percent to
60 percent.54
The fact that different questions are used to measure nationalist sentiment is, of
course, problematic, though it could be argued that the question in the Russian
survey is better suited to the Russian context than the question in the Ukrainian
survey would have been. In order to permit some sort of comparison, therefore, I
have analyzed the results of a previous survey which is unique in that it both asks
questions which are very similar to those utilized in the above analyses and spans
multiple republics. The results are presented in the next section.
Generalizeability
One final question is that of generalizeability: how widespread is the relationship
between liberalism and nationalism? Fortunately, Gibson and Duch (1990) con-
ducted a survey in nine Soviet republics which contains items that might be of use
in answering this question.55 I was able to reconstruct something very close to the
liberalism variable used above,56 and  another  question in the survey gauged
respondents’ attitudes toward nationalists. In general, if I am correct about the
prevalence of liberal nationalism in the Soviet successor states, we should find that
the relationship between liberalism and nationalism is negative in Russia and
positive in the other successor states. We should also find that the relationship
between liberalism and nationalism is strongest in those states that were most active
FIG 1. Liberalism and the legitimacy of the use of force.
54 The differences in the levels of support for these two dependent variables is striking but understandable; the word
“nationalist,” in Russian as in Ukrainian, carries strong negative connotations, and Russian dissatisfaction with reform
in late 1995 made the alternative to Russia’s seeking its own path—following the path of developed Western
countries—largely unappealing.
55 Unfortunately only eight could be used, as there were too few Estonian respondents to permit analysis.
56 Three questions in the Gibson and Duch survey neatly paralleled the questions used to form the liberalism variable
in the CPS surveys, although the wording was not the same; see the Appendix for details.
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in their pursuit of independence—in particular, in the Baltic states—and weakest
in Russia itself. The results are reproduced in Table 4, in order of the magnitude
of the coefficients, and conform roughly to expectations, though the small number
of respondents in most republics makes interpretation uncertain. The relationship
between liberalism and attitudes toward nationalists is positive in all eight republics,
though it reaches statistical significance in only three. The largest coefficients are
to be found in the Baltic states, Georgia, and Ukraine (though the coefficient in
Armenia is surprisingly large as well). The coefficient in Russia, by contrast, is
minuscule; although it is not negative, given the ratio of the coefficient to its
standard error the population parameter is about as likely to be negative as positive.
In short, these results suggest that the affinity between liberalism and nationalism
is widespread in the successor states. It is stronger, as expected, in those states in
which the two ideologies were more closely united in their pursuit of independence.
Conclusion
The goal of this article is to test the applicability of democratic peace arguments to
the Soviet successor states, which was called into question because of the alliance
between liberalism and nationalism characteristic of newly independent states. The
findings suggest the following:
1. Liberal nationalism seems to be fairly widespread in the (non-Russian) former
republics of the Soviet Union. Available evidence strongly suggests that this form of
liberalism is not particularly pacifistic and in fact seems to predispose its adherents
toward the use of force, especially in the name of national autonomy. Accordingly,
the spread of this particular form of liberalism may hurt rather than help the
prospects for peace. Where liberalism and nationalism find no common ground, as
in Russia, however, liberalism does seem to play a pacifying role.
FIG 2. Liberalism and nationalism.
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2. The results most consistently support the contention that the combination of
liberalism—whether or not of the nationalist variety—and perceptions of democracy
improves relations among countries by lowering perceptions of hostility.
3. The extent to which national leaders possess more bellicose attitudes or more
negative images of potential opponents depends to a large extent on who those
leaders are. If the people in control of foreign policy are political and military elites,
there is considerable evidence to demonstrate that their images of potential oppo-
nents are more negative than those of the citizenry and some to suggest that they
are more willing to advocate the use of force. To the extent that a more diverse
group of elites has influence over policy, however, these generalizations are less
likely to hold.
4. The findings support the conclusion that democratization, if widely imple-
mented and recognized, may improve the prospects for peace among the Soviet
successor states by improving relations among them. The evidence presented here
supports such a possibility for both structural and normative reasons.57 If, however,
peace obtains in the face of persistent disagreements over issues of autonomy and
57 Remember, however, that I make no claims regarding the ability of political institutions to constrain leaders in
the former Soviet Union, which is a necessary component of the structural argument. In particular, if Mansfield and
Snyder (1995) are correct, dysfunctional institutions may render the benefits of constraint null and void.
TABLE 4. Relationship of Liberalism to Attitudes Toward Nationalism
in Eight Soviet Republics, 1990
Liberalism in . . . Attitude toward nationalists
Latvia 0.354*
(0.192)
Lithuania 0.264**
(0.106)
Armenia 0.132
(0.104)
Georgia 0.119
(0.100)
Ukraine 0.074**
(0.029)
Moldavia 0.051
(Moldova) (0.126)
Belorussia 0.019
(Belarus) (0.071)
Russia 0.004
(0.020)
Source: Gibson and Duch 1990 survey (ICPSR 6099). Valid Ns are from top, 16, 25, 39, 20, 361, 25, 70,
843; Estonia was dropped from analysis due to an insufficient number of respondents.
Numbers are probit coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Tests of significance are two-tailed.
*significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level
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the rights of national minorities, it may do so despite liberal attitudes toward the use
of force rather than because of them.
These points suggest that peace among democracies in the region is sustainable
but will be especially vulnerable to national issues and to the effects of narrow
political institutions, both on foreign policy and foreign perceptions.58 The former
is especially likely to provoke liberal nationalists, while the latter diminishes per-
ceptions of democracy abroad and eschews the moderating influence of a broader
policy-making community. Accordingly, the most promising scenario for regional
peace would involve both a broad distribution of decision-making power among
elites (both to moderate the perceptions and attitudes of the leadership and to foster
the image of a democratic state abroad) and vigilance against any hint of mistreat-
ment of national minorities or infringements upon the autonomy of other states.59
The results also suggest that democratic peace scholars have overlooked a critical
aspect of liberal norms: liberalism is not monolithic, and the context in which it
arises strongly influences its implications for peace.
Appendix
Variables to Be Operationalized and Questions Used
Liberalism (R93, U94, R95)
(To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:)
“In any society there will always be a need to forbid the public expression of
dangerous ideas.” (–)
“The rights of the individual must be defended even if guilty people sometimes go
free.” (+)
“Competition among various political parties makes our political system stronger.” (+)
Liberalism (SSV90)
(I am now going to read you a number of statements. Would you please indicate
whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly:)
“Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger
to society of extremist political views.” (–)
“It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that
they become disruptive.” (–)
“There is too much democracy in the Soviet Union today.” (–)
Extent to which other states are believed to be democratic (R93, U94, R95)
“Please tell me for each country I mention if you think it is more democratic than,
less democratic than, or about as democratic as (Russia/Ukraine)?”
Friendly/hostile relations with other states (R93, U94, R95)
“Please tell me for each one (of these countries) about its relations with (Rus-
sia/Ukraine). Is it very friendly, rather friendly, neutral, rather hostile, or very hostile
toward (Russia/Ukraine)?”
58 For a detailed account of national minorities across the globe see Gurr (1993:326–63 and passim).
59 Current prospects for the former seem grim. The elites polled in the 1995 survey of Russia were also asked to
rank various institutions and groups in terms of their influence over foreign policy, on a scale of 1 (none) to 7 (total).
The President received a mean score of 6.2, while the Duma and the public received scores of 3.5 and 3.0, respectively.
(The other contenders were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5.1), the Ministry of Defense (4.4), the biznes-elita (4.2), and
regional leaders (3.3).) The distribution suggests that Russia’s foreign policy will be heavily influenced by its Presi-
dent—and that it will be judged accordingly.
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Legitimacy of use of force (U94)
“Do you think it is legitimate to use military force to: (defend the territorial integrity
of Ukraine; defend Ukrainian economic interests; defend the interests of Ukraini-
ans living in other former republics of the USSR; defend the interests of Ukrainians
elsewhere; achieve national security; contribute to the resolution of other conflicts;
achieve conditions that would enable Ukraine to get out of its present crisis)” (Y/N)
Legitimacy of use of force (R95)
“Do you think it is legitimate to use military force to: (defend the territorial integrity
of Russia; defend Russian economic interests; defend the interests of Russians living
in other former republics of the USSR; defend the interests of Russians elsewhere;
defend the interests of the Russian state; defend the security of our friends abroad;
achieve conditions that would enable Russia to get out of its present crisis)” (Y/N)
Attitudes about citizenship (U94)
“People have different views about what it means to be a citizen of Ukraine. Here
are some statements people have made about this. Please tell me whether you
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement: a. No one
should be a citizen of Ukraine, unless he or she has lived here for at least ten years.
d. It is absolutely essential that Ukraine be a place where the ideas of everyone,
including members of ethnic minorities, are welcome. e. Anyone who lives in
Ukraine is a Ukrainian.”
Nationalism (U94)
“Our society is made up of different groups of people. Any individual may have
much in common with some of these groups and very little in common with other
groups. On this card is a list of various social groups. For each of these groups, I
would like to find out how much you have in common with their ideas, interests,
and outlooks on different events: a great deal, some, very little, or nothing. . . .
h. Ukrainian nationalists. (+)
Nationalism (SSV90)
“And now we’d like to ask you about your attitudes towards some groups of people.
I am going to read you a list of some groups that are currently active in social and
political life. Here is a card showing a scale from 1 to 11. A “1” indicates that you
DISLIKE the group very much; an “11” indicates that you LIKE the group very
much. . . . What is your attitude toward nationalists?” (+)
Integral nationalism (U94)
“People have different views about what it means to be a citizen of Ukraine. Here
are some statements people have made about this. Please tell me whether you
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement: b. A
person who can not speak Ukrainian has no right to be a citizen of Ukraine. (+)
c. More than anything else, Ukraine is the homeland of ethnic Ukrainians. (+)”
“Here are several assertions about which there are various viewpoints. What is your
opinion: do you fully agree with them, partially agree, partially disagree, or fully
disagree? . . . f. The unity of Ukraine is more important than the needs of individual
regions. (+)”
(R93) = 1993 Russian survey, (U94) = 1994 Ukrainian survey, (R95) = 1995 Russian survey,
(SSV90) = 1990 Survey of Soviet Values (Gibson and Duch, 1990)
(+) = positive response positively associated with indicator, (–) = positive response negatively associated
with indicator
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